Richtlinien Entführung

1. Die Befehlskette

Wenn ein von der FAA überwachtes Flugzeug sich dauerhaft auffällig verhält, kann irgendwann das Militär zur Aufklärung eingeschaltet werden. Stellt sich das auffällige Verhalten als Entführung heraus, schreibt das Protokoll eine solche Einschaltung vor.
Eine übersichtliche, 9/11 gültige Beschreibung der generellen Befehlskette innerhalb der FAA für diesen, den Entführungsfall, liefert Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist im ARTCC Boston (ZBW):

The official protocol I believe is as follows, the controller told the supervisor, the supervisor told the OMIC. The OMIC called the ROC (Regional Operation Center), and the ROC called the hijack coordinator at FAA HQ.

Analog äußert sich Linda Schuessler, Manager for Tactical Operations, FAA HQ, die zudem darauf hinweist, dass das ARTCC auch das ATCSCC in Herndon informieren müsse.

Schuessler gave Commission staff an overview of the covert signals understood by pilots to notify that there is a hijack. She then spoke to Commission staff on her understanding of the proper procedures from the ATC level to pass information on a hijacking. Notification from a Facility OMIC would be passed to the Region Operations Center (ROC, 9 nationwide), and concurrently notifying their management chain. The ROC would in turn notify the WOC. Pre 9/11 there was not a process in place for the ROC to concurrently notify the Herndon Command Center. Pre 9/11 this was expected to be done from the facility. Also, there was a hijack coordinator it the WOC so the expectation was the hijack coordinator would be monitoring the situation, and in contact with Herndon and, and the centers/facilities. In the FAA document 7210.3 there is uniform guidance for facilities to notify their superiors in the Centers of a hijack.

Vom WOC aus, so Tony Ferrante, Manager of Air Traffic Investigations, FAA HQ, erreiche die Information dann das NMCC.

Ferrante explained that pre-9/11 a Supervisor or Operations Manger in Charge (OMIC) at a Center would call either the ROC or WOC. The WOC at Headquarters notifies Civil Aviation Security (ACS), and then the crisis management guidance is initiated for ACS to notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

Die 9/11 Kommission interviewte viele weitere Angestellte der beteiligten FAA-Einrichtungen, anhand deren Aussagen sich die Befehlskette (und auch ihre gelegentliche Unklarheit) en detail nachvollziehen lässt.

1. Die Air Traffic Controller:

He acknowledged that whenever there was a problem with a flight, the first step a controller takes is to notify the supervisor for the area.

John Hartling, ATC im ZBW

Marten stated that training and preparation for the Air Traffic Control role on 9/11 was adequate, since once the flights were airborne, and notification on the hijacking had been by the ATCs to their supervisors it was mostly the controllers job to maintain separation from AA 11, which they were able to do.

Brazilino Martens, ATC im ZBW

When the transponder had first shut off, Zilowski had told his supervisor, John Shippani, quietly.

Pete Zalewski, ATC im ZBW

His only training was to tell his supervisor in the case of a possible hijack.

David Bottiglia, ATC im ZNY

He was not aware of the procedures to obtain military assistance for a hijack. Air traffic procedures would be to render any assistance asked for by the pilot and notify supervisor. He had no knowledge of what supervisors do in hijack situations. His knowledge is based specifically on the role of the controller.

Pete McCloskey, ATC im ZNY

Merced noted that an FAA ATC has no authority to notify the military or Herndon. He notes that that is the responsibility of the supervisor for the area.

Mark Merced, ATC im ZNY

In the case of a hijack, Palmieri, as an ATC, is responsible for informing his supervisor.

Anthony Palmieri, ATC im ZNY

Her understanding of hijack procedures pre 9/11 was to notify the area supervisor, confirm hijack with the pilot, and comply with requests.

Theresa Adams, ATC im ZID

While Gayde had experienced NORDO and no transponder separately, he had never seen this scenario together. In either event, Gayde would immediately call his supervisor.

Rudolf Gayde, ATC im ZID

Procedures for a hijacking prior to 9/11 were to verify the hijack squawk code, notify the supervisor and handle requests from the cockpit. Training for hijack situations was done in the simulator and Philips followed set procedures.

Jeffery Phillips, ATC im ZID

From his training, the procedures to follow in a hijack situation are to verify the code given by the pilot of the aircraft, turn the aircraft over to the supervisor and continue working the other aircraft in the Area.

Anthony Schifano, ATC im ZID

FAA protocol for NORDO, which happens daily, is to attempt to reach the pilot, notify the supervisor, and go back to the previous sector to verify codes. For a no transponder situation, the controller is instructed to try to contact and reestablish communication with another transponder if possible.

Kevin Schott, ATC im ZID

She reiterated, “Whether or not NORAD would be involved, my only responsibility was to tell the supervisor.”

Linda Justice, ATC im ZOB

It was his instinct to have the supervisors/managers contact the military, but he did not know at the time whether or not the Center had a direct line to NORAD.

John Werth, ATC im ZOB

Zusammenfassung: Die Aufgabe eines ATC in der Kommunikationskette erschöpft sich für den Fall auffälliger Flugzeugeigenschaften wie für den Entführungsfall in der Informierung des Vorgesetzten [supervisor]. Kein ATC fühlt sich dazu beauftragt, das Militär zu informieren – was auch intuitiv einsichtig ist, da ein ATC ja parallel Flüge zu überwachen hat.
Das relevante Protokoll für einen ATC auf dem Stand von 9/11 ist die FAA Order 7110.65M Air Traffic Control, ch. 10, Emergencies, im besonderen Abschnitt 10-2-6 Hijacked Aircraft. Dort finden sich entsprechende Hinweise:

Consider that an aircraft emergency exists and inform the RCC or ARTCC and alert the appropriate DF facility when:
[...]
When you observe a Mode 3/A Code 7500, do the following:
[…]
b.
Notify supervisory personnel of the situation.
[...]
When an ELT signal is heard or reported:
[…]
b.
TERMINAL. Notify the ARTCC which will coordinate with the RCC.
[...]
a.
When information is received from any source that a bomb has been placed on, in, or near an aircraft for the purpose of damaging or destroying such aircraft, notify your supervisor or the facility air traffic manager.

Demnach wird die weitere Verantwortung je nach Sachlage innerhalb des ARTCC weitergegeben oder an das RCC.

2. Die Vorgesetzten der ATC

Bueno paged Terry Biggio, who has Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC) at the time.

Daniel Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor im ZBW

He guessed that most likely pre-9/11 protocol for the request should have been from Boston Center to the Regional Operation Command (ROC), and the ROC would process the request. He confirmed that prior to 9/11 his understanding of NORAD/NEADS role in a hijacking scenario was cloudy.

John Schippani, Supervisor for Area C im ZBW

He reports to the Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC).

Charles Alfaro, Operations Supervisor in Area C des ZNY

He reported through the operations supervisor to the Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC), Bruce Barrett who ultimately reported to Mike McCormack.

Paul Thumser, Operations Supervisor in Area B des ZNY

Contact with NORAD is beyond Povinelli’s rank, but she knows that communication is possible between the Air Traffic Control Centers and the military.

Linda Povinelli, ATC Supervisor für Area 3 des ZID

Prior to 9-11, as a supervisor in a hijack situation he would have 1) isolated the aircraft on a separate frequency, 2) divert the plane away from the other aircraft, 3) the controller would try to get the pilot to squak the appropriate code, and 4) notification the manager on duty. He did not think anyone at the Center was responsible for notifying the military.

Mark Evans, Supervisor of the Traffic Management Coordinators im ZOB

Zusammenfassung: Auch die unmittelbaren Vorgesetzten der ATCs (i.d.R. die Area Supervisors) informieren nicht das Militär; auch hier befindet sich das nächste Glied der Kommunikationskette innerhalb des ARTCC. Es handelt sich um den Operatians Manager in Charge (OMIC).

3. Die Operations Manager & der OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge)

Biggio immediately relayed that information to the Regional Operations Command (ROC).

Terry Biggio, Operations Manager in Areas A and D des ZBW

LaCates further commented that at his level of authority he has no ability to contact specific military air defense assets. He believes that the OMIC (Operations Manager in Charge) has the responsibility and operational knowledge to contact the military.

David LaCates, Deputy Operations Manager im ZNY

From the controller up the chain-of-command is: Air Traffic Controller, Operations Supervisor, Operations Manager, LeCates, McCormick. There are 5 Operations Managers, who rotate the duty of OMIC, Operations Manager In Charge. The OMIC has specific responsibility for an entire shift; all the operational guidance and supervision for that shift.

Mike McCormick, Air Traffic Manager im ZNY

Before 9/11, Weed would not have thought to call NORAD in the event of a hijack; she would have notified her supervisor, John Thomas, who would have made further notifications.

Sally Weed, Support Manager for Operations im ZID

He doesn’t know if that has changed as a result of 9-11. Operations managers have a checklist of who to contact in the event of a hijacking. First on the list is law enforcement. At an airport, the LEOs would be local, for instance. If the event takes place in the air, the RCC (regional communications center) [sic! Das Rescue Coordination Center ist gemeint] would be contacted. He said that it is the responsibility of the RCC to contact the military. It would be their responsibility to contact the military if a plane went missing, as well. Kettel said, “Leave that all up to the RCC.” RCC is the military counterpart to the FAA.

Richard Kettel, Air Traffic Manager im ZOB

On September 10, 2001, Wernica thought that in the event of a hijacking the controller handling the plane was to tell the supervisor of the area who in turn told the manager. Then the manager would call the regional operations center. She does not know what NORAD is; so she probably would have called the Command Center, too.

Kim Wernica, Operations Manager im ZOB

Before 9-11, a controller encountering a flight believed to be hijacked, he would first tell the Command Center, then he would try to confirm it was a hijack. On September 10,2001, he would not have thought NORAD would have been involved in resolving the hijack.

Leo Wolbers, former Operations Manager im ZOB

Zusammenfassung: Auch der OMIC informiert nicht das Militär, zumindest nicht im Entführungsfall. Die Angaben schwanken zwischen RCC, ROC und dem ATCSCC Herndon.

4. Das ROC (Regional Operations Center)

On September 11, 2001 Dion had been in his current position, a regional operations officer for communications at the ROC, for four years. Dion reports to Jennifer Donoghue [sic!]. […] He acknowledged that contacting the Washington Operations Center (WaC) would be a priority. COMSAT does not make notice outside of the FAA unless it is directed to do so by the wac.

Richard Dion, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security (COMSAT) im ROC des ZBW

Donahue’s office at the FAA ROC in Burlington, Massachusetts is primarily a communications hub responsible for communications security, conferencing, and facilitating a steady flow of information amongst FAA entities in the Boston Center region, between Boston Center and other FAA regional centers, and finally connecting Boston Center administration with FAA administrative headquarters at the FAA Washington Operations Center (WOC). […] Prior to 9/11, the COMSAT’s hijack procedure was to 1) contact the WOC; 2) contact the ROC’s security division; and 3) contact the ROC’s own management team. COMSAT had and has an Air Traffic Handbook (80-20) that considers a hijack a “security event”, and prior to 9/11 required the ROC to contact WOC, but post 9111 includes primary and secondary notification protocols (primary – WOC, ROC security; secondary – Regional Administrator, REM, Air Traffic, and Flight Standards). Since 9111, the COMSAT has also installed a direct open line to the WOC.

Jennifer Donahue, Regional Executive Manager (REM) for Communications Information Security (COMSAT) im ROC des ZOB

COMSAT is similar to a dispatching service for the nine offices internally at the ROC, but the differ in that they gather information that is at times passed through local state agencies. COMSAT then notifies the proper entities. They would notify the WOC (Washington Operations Center) dependent on the severity of the situation (a fatality), or whether the incident was newsworthy.

Barry O’Connor, Regional Operations Officer for Communications Information Security (COMSAT) im ROC des ZBW

Zusammenfassung: Das ROC informiert die FAA in D.C. (WOC). Damit bewegt sich die Information über ein auffälliges Flugzeug im fünften Schritt aus dem betroffenen ARTCC und der betroffenen Region heraus, ist jedoch noch immer nicht beim Militär angelangt.

5. WOC

Hat die Information über eine mögliche Flugzeugentführung die FAA in Washington erreicht, ist diese beauftragt, das NMCC, also das Kontrollzentrum des DoD, einzuschalten.

Was anyone speaking to the NMCC? Someone did, but not sure who or where. Because WOC is responsible for that conversation it goes througj [sic] there.

Mike Cirillo, FAA HQ

Ferrante explained that pre-9/11 a Supervisor or Operations Manger in Charge (OMIC) at a Center would call either the ROC or WOC. The WOC at Headquarters notifies Civil Aviation Security (ACS), and then the crisis management guidance is initiated for ACS to notify the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

Tony Ferrante, FAA HQ

Das entsprechende Protokoll seitens des Militärs hierfür ist die CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION CJCSI 3610.01a, AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING) AND DESTRUCTION OF DERELICT AIRBORNE OBJECTS, die verlautet:

In the event of a hijacking, the NMCC will be notified by the most expeditious means by the FAA.

Die Komplementärorder der FAA ist die FAA Order 7610.4, Special Military Operations:

The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator [on duty at Washington headquarters] by direct contact with the National Military Command Center (NMCC).

6.SoD

Vom NMCC geht eine Anfrage an den SoD:

The NMCC will, with the exception of immediate responses as authorized by reference d, forward requests for DOD assistance to the Secretary of Defense for approval.

CJCSI 3610.01a

7.NORAD

Und die Aufforderung an NORAD:

(1) When notified that military escort aircraft are needed in conjunction with an aircraft piracy (hijacking) emergency, the DDO, NMCC, will notify the appropriate unified command or USELEMNORAD to determine if suitable aircraft are available and forward the request to the Secretary of Defense for approval in accordance with DODD 3025.15, paragraph D.7 (reference d).

CJCSI 3610.01a

Innerhalb des Militärs ab NORAD muss die gesamte Befehlskette nach unten (NORAD – der entsprechende Sektor – die AFB) abgeklappert werden. Dazu ist es jedoch 9/11 nicht gekommen, da die Kommunikationskette in FAA HQ unterbrochen wurde und es parallel zu dieser langen Befehlskette eigenständige Handlungen der ARTCCs gab.
Festgehalten werden darf an dieser Stelle: Die 5-Minuten-Protokolle, von denen in bestimmten Kreisen (i.d.R. beleglos) fabuliert wird, sind mit dieser langen Befehlskette nur schwer vereinbar.
Der 9/11 CR folgert daher mit nachvollziehbarer Berechtigung:

In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that
- The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
- There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
- Hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.

(9/11 CR. S. 18, meine Hervorh.; in den Fußnoten bezieht sich der 9/11 CR auf die drei auch hier angeführten Protokolle)

2. Fallbeispiel: Das ZBW 9/11

Am Beispiel des ZBW und AA 11 lassen sich zwei Aspekte aufzeigen, das (9/11 kontraproduktive) Festhalten am Protokoll sowie das (hilfreiche, aber am Ende erfolglose) Handeln jenseits der Richtlinien:

1. Handeln nach Protokoll

Pete Zalewski und Brazilino Martens, zwei der involvierten ATCs, informieren um 08:14, 08:21 und 08:24 EDT ihren Vorgesetzten John Schippani über das auffällige Verhalten von AA 11 und schließlich die Entführung. Kurz nach 08:21 EDT wird auch die Traffic-Management-Abteilung TMU (Daniel Bueno) über die Situation aufgeklärt. Um 08:27 EDT informiert Personal der TMU das ATCSCC Herndon und um 08:30 EDT das ROC.
Vgl. detailliert die ZBW timeline

2. Handeln out of the box

Personal des ZBW versucht nach Ingangsetzung der formellen Kommunikationskkette zudem eigenständig, NEADS zu informieren. Sukzessive werden Cape TRACON (Otis AFB) – bedingt erfolgreich -, Atlantic City – unerfolgreich – und dann NEADS – erfolgreich – von den Geschehnissen in Kenntnis gesetzt.

On my end when I first got down to the floor, Dan Bueno the STMCIC had called Cape TRACON, which owned the airspace above Otis ANGB, and then he called Otis Tower and asked the aircraft to scramble so they could escort AAL11.  I am not sure whom he called first.  Otis Tower advised him that that clearance had to come form NEADS.  He then had Joe Cooper make the call to NEADS with a request for fighters.
This is when I arrived; Joe had just made the call.  I am a lot more familiar in dealing with NEADS then anyone else, and Bueno had called up to my office to have me come down ASAP and help out.  I arrived around 8:34 to 8:36 I guess.  I waited about 30 seconds and really wanted to call but didn’t want to step on anybody’s toes down there.  I had asked Joe Cooper if he gave all of the information regarding AAL11, like location and possible altitude, he said he couldn’t remember everything he told tem but he thought he had.  That’s when I called.

Colin Scoggins, Military Operations Specialist im ZBW

After Cape TRACON was contacted by FAA personnel, Cape TRACON called Otis. Bueno mentioned the possibility of scrambling fighters from Atlantic City to Collin Scoggins.

Daniel D. Bueno, Traffic Management Supervisor im ZBW

Dan Bueno asked Cooper to call for military assistance. Cooper began speaking with Huntress at approximately 123754UTC. He asked Huntress to send Fl6s out of Otis Air Force Base. Cooper did not know the physical location of Huntress (Rome, New York). Cooper asked Bradley to stop departures headed towards New York when AA 11 was roughly five miles south of Albany. When speaking with the military, Cooper believes he spoke with Sergeant Powell.

Joseph Cooper, Traffic Management Unit Coordinator im ZBW

Miller stated that it was Dan Bueno who contacted Otis for a fighter scramble. And that it was his understanding from conversation in the TMU that Bueno’s attempt was unsuccessful.

Toby Miller, First Line Supervisor Area C, Traffic Management Supervisor on 9/11 im ZBW

He remembers Dan Bueno attempted to contact Otis AFB for support, but Schippani did not recall the procedure for request a fighter scramble.

Jon Schippani, Operational Supervisor in Charge im ZBW
Vgl. auch hier die ZBW timeline

Einer detaillierter Blick auf einen dieser Kommunikationsprozesse zeigt beispielhaft das zweigleisige Handeln des ZBW. Daniel D. Bueno war am 11.09.2001 Traffic Management Supervisor im ZBW. Zusammen mit Terry Biggio, dem Operations Manager in Charge (OMIC), war Bueno der höchste Entscheidungsträger im ZBW. Während Terry Biggio die vorgeschriebene Kommunikationskette für den Entführungsfall in Gang hielt und deshalb nach Bekanntwerden der Entführung von AA 11 in Kontakt mit dem Regional Operations Center (ROC) trat und blieb, war Bueno für mehrere Initiativen des ZBW verantwortlich, die außerhalb der vorgeschriebenen Richtlinien zu verorten sind. Zwei zentrale Entscheidungen gehen hierbei auf sein Konto:
1. Die Entscheidung, Controller der FAA anzurufen, die für die Otis ANGB zuständig sind, und um einen scramble zu bitten (eigenhändig).
2. Die Entscheidung, NEADS anzurufen und um einen scramble zu bitten (über Joseph Cooper und Colin Scoggins).
In den MFRs der 9/11 Kommission werden beide Entscheidungen von den Beteiligten wohlwollend kommentiert. Die Entscheidung, direkt bei der Otis ANGB anzurufen, wird hierbei als instinktive Handlung begriffen, die der Dringlichkeit der Situation angemessen war (meine Hervorh.):

No person Staff interviewed seriously considered contacting NEADS through the process on paper-FAA~NMCC-NORAD, if they were even aware of it. Dan Bueno gets high marks from Center personnel for instinctively calling FAA traffic approach personnel at the location where he knew the fighters to be – Otis AFB. Bueno called Otis because he knew “from the eighties” that is where military assistance caine from. He also considered Burlington VT and Atlantic City NJ for the same reason. Even Mr. Scoggins, who knew that the call had to go to NEADS, did not fault Bueno for trying to call the AF Wing directly through other FAA personnel.

ZBW Briefing

Based on Bueno’s memory of a previous hijack, Bueno called Cape TRACON for an immediate fighter escort out of OTIS Air Force Base. He knew that the call should have gone to North East Air Defense (NEADS), but due to the urgency of the circumstance called directly to the FAA contact point for Otis.

Bueno MFR

Die entsprechenden Telefonate sind auf Band festgehalten (ZBW TMU Severe Weather Position, O-Ton, Transkript). Die Anfrage erreicht einen für die Otis ANGB zuständigen FAA-Controller um 08:34 Uhr:

1234:42 CAPE 1 cape tracon
1234:33 ZBWTMU yeah hi uh are you able to able to talk to otis on this line
1234:41 CAPE 1  umm im not sure but if i need if you need to get in touch with them i need uh
1234:45 ZBWTMU yeah i got a little situation here

Dieser informiert nach ersten Informationen über AA 11 seinen Vorgesetzten, Tim Spence.

1234:58 alright well hold on a second let me give you the sup — hey timmy pick up on the forty one something about a scramble i don´t know
1235:10 CAPE 2 cape approach
1235:11 ZBWTMU hi cape uh dan bueno calling from boston center
1235:13 CAPE 2 yes
1235:14 ZBWTMU i have a situation with american eleven possible hijack

Spence verspricht einen Rückruf, der um 08:43 erfolgt – ein scamble brauche erst die Autorisierung durch NEADS und sei bereits im Gange (meine Hervorh.):

1243:09 CAPE2 yeah it’s cape tracon here is dan there
1243:11 ZBWTMU that’s me
1243:12 CAPE2 hey uh we just i just talked to otis here and they said they needed a uh neads authorization
1243:16 ZBWTMU we’re uh working with neads to see if uh they should be calling you now
1243:20 CAPE2 okay just to let you know okay we got uh call on a panta panta papa alpha november tango alpha four five and four six flight of two they’ll be airborne soon
1243:30 ZBWTMU great thank you
1243:32 CAPE2 alright

Spence kommentiert (Spence MFR, S. 2):

Spence commented that there was confusion, especially since the Base Operations standard operating procedure was to contact the Centers with information. It was unusual for the Centers to contact TRACON for information. Normally the FAA receives the call from the military for a scramble, but this time it went the other way around, and then the official order came back down from the military.

Alle Beteiligten sind sich also einig, dass der Versuch Buenos, direkt bei der Otis ANGB anzurufen, eine Protokollverletzung darstellt, von Colin Scoggins über Tim Spence bis zu Dan Bueno selbst. Sie wird jedoch als angemessen angesichts der Situation begriffen.

Ab diesem Moment traten komplexere Abläufe in Kraft, die an dieser Stelle nicht erörtert werden sollen. Festgehalten werden sollte:
(i) Ein ATC ist i.d.R. nicht und im Entführungsfall eindeutig nicht verantwortlich für die Einbindung des Militärs.
(ii) Das Protokoll sah für den Entführungsfall eine lange Kommunikationskette von der FAA zum NMCC zu NORAD vor – diese Kommunikationskette umfasst alleine bis zur Ankunft der Bitte um Abfangjäger bei NORAD sieben Glieder.
(iii) ZBW setzte diese Kommunikationskette in Kraft, verkürzte sie allerdings zusätzlich durch eigene Anrufe. Um 08:34 Uhr wurde die FAA im Cape TRACON, zuständig für die Otis ANGB, um 8:37 Uhr wurde NEADS erreicht.

Hinterlasse eine Antwort

Deine E-Mail-Adresse wird nicht veröffentlicht. Erforderliche Felder sind markiert *

*

Du kannst folgende HTML-Tags benutzen: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>