Zeugen

Andreas Hauß beklagt fehlende Zeugen. Darunter auf seiner Webseite bezüglich NORAD:

Zudem können Unterlinge von Interviewwünschen abgeschottet werden, und die Häuptlinge können Erinnerungslücken, fehlende Akten usw. vortäuschen.

Abschottung? Mit u.a. Dwayne Acoff, Robert Lucaro, Bill Aires, Steve Bianchi, Richard Crane, Dawne Deskins, Steve Hedrick, Michael Kelly, Jeffrey LaMarche, Jeffrey Richmond, Robert Marr, Joe McCain, Kevin Nasypany, Pete O´Mara, Fred Davies, Jeremy Powell, Susan Marie Rose, Stacie Rountree, Ian Sanderson, Clark Speicher, Mark Stuart, Shelley Watson für NEADS, Edward Eberhart, Rick Findley, Ken Merchant, Robert Seetin für das North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Don Arias, Randy Morris, Steve Usher, Larry Arnold, Robert DelToro, Craig McKinley, Jim Millowich, Steve Usher, William Scott für die Continental NORAD Region (CONR), Daniel Caine, Timothy Duffy, Michael Kelly, Ljelvik, David McNulty, Daniel Nash, Donald Quenneville, Marc Sasseville, David Wherley, Crew Chiefs Wing & Stiers, Paul Worcester für die U.S. Air Force (USAF) gibt es ausreichend „Unterlinge“, um einen repräsentativen Eindruck vom Geschehen erlangen zu können.
Insofern ist wenn, dann diese Interpretation einschlägig:

Beim NEADS, dem nordöstlichen Verteidigungsbereich, hält Major Kevin Nasypany seinen Chefs, den Generälen Marr und Arnold, den Rücken frei. Hier noch zwei Unterlinge von Nasypany, Sanders und Deskins, die brav ihren Chef decken. Wie es sich gehört: [...] Das ist Corpsgeist. Wer schickt schon seinen Chef auf den Elektrischen Stuhl, wenn die Karriere winkt …

Belege für die schwerwiegenden Unterstellungen gibt es nicht.
Im Falle der FAA setzt Hauß noch einen drauf:

Er [Bottiglia] schweigt sich aus darüber, daß er auch die AAL11 “betreute”, wenn er es überhaupt war und nicht ein Hollywood-Darsteller.

Im Reigen der uns vorgestellten unzuständigen Zeitzeugen am 11.9. erscheint auf diesem Video eine Dame, angeblich Fluglotse, angeblich vom Dulles Airport. Nehmen wir es ihr so ab.

Freie Phantasie einer Schauspieltruppe kommt häufiger vor.

Mit Name, Biographie und Flugüberwachungszentrum bekannte Controller und sonstige Angestellte der FAA bestätigen die Abläufe ebenfalls dutzendfach. Terry Biggio, Dan Bueno, Joseph Cooper, William Dean, Richard Dion, Jennifer Donahue, John Hartling, Robert Jones, Shirley Kula, Brazilino Martens, Alan Miller, Toby Miller, Barry O´Connor, Steven Roebuck, John Schippani, Colin Scoggins, Pete Zalewski für AA 11. Charles Alfaro, Lorraine Barret, David Bottiglia, Kevin Delaney, Evanna Dowis, Robert Felser, Martin Founnier, Jack Jackson, James Kurz, David LaCates, Peter McCloskey, Mike McCormick, Mark Merced, Anthony Palmieri, Martin Rosenberg, Chistopher Tucker, Paul Thumser für UA 175. Theresa Adams, Dave Boone, Richard Byard, Randy Kath, Jeffrey Phillips, Linda Povinelli, Anthony Schifano und Kevin Schott, ergänzend Rudolph Gayde, Bill Orr und Sally Weed für AA 77. Greg Dukeman, Mark Evans, Linda Justice, Tom Kerinko, Richard Kettel, Kim Wernica, John Werth und Leo Wolbers für UA 93.
M.a.W.: Die Schauspielertruppe ist eine ganze Kompanie. Fehlende Zeugen? Mitnichten.
Ein konkretes Beispiel zeigt die unbeabsichtige Wirkung der Zeugenforderung – ihre Erfüllung unterläuft rhetorisch gemeinte Fragen:

Aber es fehlen Interviews mit einigen der vielen hundert Piloten ziviler Flugzeuge, die im Luftraum die Versuche der Lotsen mitgehört haben müßten, Funkkontakt mit den jeweils entführten Maschinen zu bekommen.GAB ES vielleicht diese Versuche nicht?

Die Stürmung des Cockpits von UA 93 sowie die Durchsage von Terrorist Ziad Jarrah wurde laut Controller John Werth in Cleveland von mehreren weiteren Piloten mitgehört.

He heard the screaming in the cockpit come over the frequency, but he was not sure which of the 7-8 planes it was coming from. He looked at his “D side” (the controller that assists him on his right to confirm he heard what he thought he heard. He yelled, “I think we’ve got one,” to the supervisor, Mark Barnik. They put the frequency on the speaker, so that everyone heard it the second time. He described the sound as a “muffled struggle. They distinguished the words, “get out of here.”
He called out to all the planes and UA 93 was the only plane that did not answer. Other pilots on the frequency confirmed they heard the screaming. […] Werth said there were two statements made about a bomb. Mention of a bomb on board meant it was increasingly important to keep other planes away from him. For instance, he had no idea what the shock or range of nuclear explosion at that altitude would do. Word of a bomb on board did not change the way they handled the situation. His supervisor and the managers were all well aware of the situation by that point.
9:27a.m. – normal transmission from UA 93
9:28 a.m. – hear the first scream
At this point, Werth was waiting for a plane to turn its transponder off. He knew that was the only way the plane was going to get to its target.
9′:29 – 9:30 a.m. – Werth identified UA 93 as the source of the screaming (he had descended, and then back up again).
From 9:20-9:30 a.m., he received many calls from pilots. Werth didn’t know what standard procedure was; as a controller, he is trying not to panic people. He told them to call their company. He never said “hijack” on frequency. That’s why he didn’t want to say “trip” because that is a well-known code.
He also did not know if it was appropriate to ask another pilot to follow him.

Zu diesen Piloten gehörten Dave Dunlap und Paul Werner, die Lynn Spencer für „Touching History“ (2008) interviewt hat.

Radio communications have been silent in the cockpit of Delta 1989 since the flurry of activity when United 93 was hijacked. Dunlap has heard it all on the radio. He stares out of the cockpit window of the Boeing 767, his mind racing with thoughts about the hell those pilots are going through. […] He’s jolted from his thoughts when he hears his flight’s call sign on the frequency. `Delta 1989, I have traffic for you at your 11 o’clock,´ the controller says, `15 miles southbound, 41 [41,000 feet] climbing, looks like he’s turning east.´ United 93 has turned around, and it´s coming their way.
Dunlap and Captain Werner scout the skies for the aircraft, but they can’t spot it. Then, out of nowhere, it flashes past, just above their left wing. (S. 166f.)

In the cockpit of Delta 1989, Dunlap and Werner both heard the word that there was a bomb on board on United 93, and they are acutely aware that many bombs are designed to detonate with changes of altitude, so they are extremely tense about descending into Cleveland. (S. 168)

Weitere mithörende Piloten saßen, wie aus den Tapes der FAA Cleveland hervorgeht, in den Maschinen UA 23, Executive Jet 956 und UA 36.
Im Flugzeug UA 23 waren das Tom Manello und Carol Timmons (vgl. Lynn Spencer, “Touching History”, S. 102). Im Executive Jet 956 waren das Todd Sherwood Edgar, den das FBI am 12.09.01 befragte, und Roger Lampman. Das sind bereits sechs namentlich bekannte Zeugen für “angebliche Funkmitschnitte” auf der eingeforderten Pilotenseite, von den Controllern des ZOB ganz zu schweigen. Zu diesen gehören John Werth:

I heard two transmissions which sounded like a struggle took place. Shortly afterwards the aircraft descended several hundred feet. The aircraft made an abrupt turn at DJB VOR to the south. Two more transmissions followed, stating that a bomb was on board, the aircraft had started to climb and was heading s/e in the general direction of two other aircraft which I had already started to vector away from UAL93.

Mike Zientarski.

A transmission was made that was unintelligible to me but another aircraft claimed to have heard that a bomb was on board.

Craig Pass.

Transmissions were made without callsign. Other aircraft on frequency overheard the unidentified transmissions and inquired if the controller was aware of situation.

Kimberley Wernica.

While I was briefing them on Delta 1989 the LORAIN Controller said that he needed someone to listen to his frequency because there was screaming on it. I told Mark Bornick, the supervisor, to plug in, and I went up to the Watch Desk. I asked STMC Craig Pass to bring up the LORAIN frequency so we could hear it because there was a problem. When we listened we heard the controller trying to reach UAL 93 several times, then I heard him talk to 2 other aircraft about the transmissions he had just heard. Both aircraft heard the screaming. Then a voice came on shouting and used the words “bomb onboard”. The controller asked the caller to say again. I went to the area and confirmed that they also heard “bomb onboard” the sup[ervisor] confirmed this.

Mike Barnick.

Using a handset, I plugged into the LORAIN RADAR position and monitored the frequency. Shortly thereafter, I heard some type of yelling and screaming on the frequency as well as someone stating that they [“]have a bomb”. Numerous other aircraft on the frequency confirmed that they also heard the “have a bomb” statement.

(Aus den “ZOB Personnel Statements” 1 und 2.)

Zeuge von Cockpitübernahme des Fluges United 93 und den Versuchen der Controller, den Flug zu erreichen, war außerdem Passagier Michael McNeil an Bord des Fluges United 1523. Er nutzte das Unterhaltungs-Programm von United – der Kanal 9 macht das Mithören des ATC-Geschehens für Passagiere möglich, falls der Pilot der Maschine es zulässt.

On September 11, 2001, McNeil, a free lance television engineer-sports was a passenger on United Airline UAL Flight 1523 from LaGuardia New York Airport to Denver in seat 6A, when he overheard the flight communications from his plane, Cleveland Center and UAL Flight 93; sometime after 9:00. He had been listening with earphones since he departed. He had been in New York working the U.S. Tennis Open in Flushing Meadows, New York.
While listening, he heard that New York area airspace was closed. He heard two ten second bursts of unintelligible yelling and altercation. Cleveland Center asked for a repeat and identification. Cleveland Center began a roll call of aircraft in the air space. He next heard what sounded like, “I” or “We have a bomb.” The pilot or co-pilot on UAL 93 must have had keyed open the microphone. Cleveland Center said, “Come back.” A Continental flight crew member responded with an interpretation, “He said he had a bomb.” Cleveland Center began to instruct planes away from the area. The crew of his flight turned off the passenger monitoring system.

FBI-Befragung McNeil

Von fehlenden Zeugen kann demnach keine Rede sein.
Ein weiteres Beispiel bringt Hauß selbst an:

Von wem sind der Öffentlichkeit angebliche Funkmitschnitte überliefert? Vom Kapitän der UA175, Saracini, dem in den Mund gelegt wird, er sehe gerade die AAL11 auf Gegenkurs in 10km Höhe. Auch habe er etwas Seltsames von der AAL11 gehört, von einer Bombe an Bord. Das hält er erst auf Anfrage für mitteilenswert? Saracini kann nicht mehr dazu interviewt werden – seine Maschine war die, die eine Minute nach diesem angeblichen Funkgespräch ebenfalls „entführt“ wurde und in das WTC2 einschlug.

Die Anweisung an Saracini sowie dessen eigene Angaben zu AA 11 sind auf den FAA-Tapes des ZBW nachzuhören. Saracinis Kommentar zu Mohammed Attas Durchsage ist auf den FAA-Tapes des ZNY nachzuhören (ch. 5 ZNY 292 R42 1235-1316 UTC SS; Transkript). UA 175 und AA 11 funkten im Zeitraum der Durchsage beide auf derselben Frequenz (Boston Center, 127.82 (Quelle)). Die Aufnahme der Durchsage von Atta war auch Teil der Beweiskette im Prozess gegen Moussaoui und ist seit Jahren öffentlich einhörbar. Mehrere Zeugen im Boston Center bestätigen die Geschehnisse – Pete Zalewski:

As AA 11 starts to tum Zilowski heard a strange voice over the frequency. He noted that since he had experience at air route with heavy international traffic, an Arabic pilot’s voice wasn’t unusual to him. But in this sector, Zilowski noted that most pilots are American, so he thought the Arabic voice was out of place. Zilowski could not distinguish the message in the first transmission. It was the second transmission that he heard clearly. He “screamed” to his supervisor, and told him of the hijack. He put AA11 on the loudspeaker for the section. He had no RA to assist, and asked for an immediate “D” side. He concentrated on listening for communication from AAII and, once Greg Tichini became his RA, gave Tichini all the planes in his sector.

John Hartling:

He was handling departures out of Bradley (Hartford, CN), and put a US Air flight above AA 11 in an attempt to get an altitude estimate. The US Air flight was unable to get a visual and Hartling then asked UALI75, who was able to get a visual and an estimate of FL 270 to FL 290.
It was at this point that Hartling heard his supervisor in the background mention threatening communications from the cockpit of AA11.

John Schippani:

AA11 became a real concern for Schippani when the transponder signal shut off. Schippani went to Area B,and confirmed that they too had no contact. It . was at this point that Pete Zalewski heard what he referred to as ”’threatening” language with an “Arabic accent” from the cockpit. John assigned Al Miller to sit with Zalewski. They asked another plane in the sky, UAL175, for a visual on AA11, and UAL175 replied that AA11 had an approximate altitude of 28,000 feet.

Joseph Cooper:

At first, with only three factors, NaRDO, no transponder and serious course deviation Cooper thought AA11 had experienced serious electrical damage. But after the hard left turn and the confirmation of a hijack through the cockpit communication, there was no doubt in Cooper’s mind.

Bob Jones:

Based off his notes, Jones stated that at 1224UTC Area C reported a possible hijack. Jones went to 46R (Pete Zilowski). Jones then went to review the recording. He relayed the recording information to the Watchdesk. He confirmed that an “Arab” voice stated “we have some planes”. Jones relayed this to Biggio immediately.

Terry Biggio:

On 9/11, Daniel Bueno paged Biggio, who came to the TMU and was briefed by Jon Schippani and Bueno. They showed Biggio AA11 on the 46R radar display, which was being worked by Peter Zalewski at the time. Bob Jones, Quality Assurance, was asked to review the tape recording for AA11 for possible unusual communications. Jones told Biggio immediately of the threatening communication, and that the speaker clearly had a middle eastern accent, and had said something like “we have some planes” and “don’t do anything stupid”. Biggio immediately relayed that information to the Regional Operations Command (ROC).

Literatur

Spencer, Lynn: Touching History. The Untold Drama that Unfolded in the Skies over America on 9/11. New York u.a.: Free Press 2008

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