Die DiLorenzo TRICARE Health Clinic (DTHC) ist eine auf Luft- und Raumfahrtmedizin spezialisierte Klinik in Washington, DC, die dem Pentagon untersteht (s.a. Wikipedia zu TRICARE). Sie stellt seit März 2000 zusammen mit der Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic ihren medizinischen Dienst den Pentagon-Mitarbeitern zur Verfügung.
Im Mai 2001, weniger Monate vor 9/11, überlegten Mitarbeiter beider Kliniken im Rahmen einer Übung, wie die Reaktion auf einen Flugzeugeinschlag ins Pentagon organisiert werden müsste.
Several months prior, the flight medicine clinic had conducted mass casualty training exercises in conjunction with the DiLorenzo clinic, which is commanded by USU class of 1982 graduate Army Col. Jim Geiling. In an eerie twist of irony, the exercise simulated a plane crashing into the building, and members of both health care facilities would soon realize how invaluable that training would be.
Der Arlington County After Action Report des US Department of Health and Human Services fasst die Übung unter der Überschrift “Planning, Training, and Preparedness” zusammen:
DTHC participation in an Arlington County EMS tabletop exercise with Arlington County EMS in May 2001 helped response preparation for the Pentagon attack. The scenario in that tabletop exercise featured a commuter airplane crashing into the Pentagon.
Colonel James Geiling, Direktor der DiLorenzo Klinik, bestätigt in einem Interview im April 2002 das Szenario eines kleinen Flugzeugs:
There were several major training events in the year prior to 9/11. One of the first events was a major three-day table top exercise (using three scenarios) conducted in October 2000. COL Geiling saw this as having some utility for planners but not much for planning actual medical response.
A second exercise occurred in May 2001. This exercise was internal to the clinic and was based on the scenario of a small commuter plane crash into the Pentagon. COL Geiling had the team of CPT Reagan Quan and SGT Kelly Penninger develop the scenario but he and the clinic’s leaders did not have advance warning of its contents.
Oberschwester Maj. Lorie A. Brown, Leiterin des DiLorenzo Action Response Team, beschreibt die Übung im Report des Pentagon Medical Department:
Having practiced over the past year our roles and worked our pieces, we knew our lanes of responsibility. I’m the chairperson for the DiLorenzo Action Response Team, DART; that is our MASCAL plan. For the past year, the DART team has been working on developing that plan, really creating a whole new plan. We sat down and met on numerous occasions with the Air Force clinic, civilian EMS, [Emergency Medical Services] Pentagon and DoD hierarchy, DPS and with the other civilian medical agencies. We worked through issues, what would happen in the event of a MASCAL, what each of our roles would be. We participated in several large tabletop exercises with these external bodies, to include FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] and the others I just mentioned. We even did our own internal exercise where we made up the scenario of a plane crashing into the building. Though you can never be prepared for an event like this, I am sure all our preparations and exercise paid off.
We actually had our MASCAL equipment out of the storage areas because we were doing an inventory. So there were many pieces that just fell into place and worked so well on that day. It was just fortuitous. It was just amazing that way that things kind of happened the way they did. But like I said our planning truly made such a huge difference on that day. Our Commander had the foresight to focus on MASCAL prep and gave us the time and budget to really revamp our old MASCAL plan. I can’t say enough about how critical this was to our success.
(Quelle: Marble/Milhiser: Soldiers to the Rescue, S. 7; vgl. auch Interview November 2001)
Die Übung ging, so die historische Abteilung des Pentagon, auf die Initiative von Colonel John Baxter von der Air Force Medicine Clinic zurück und hatte keinen Anschlag, sondern einen Unfall zum Hintergrund:
The attack did not find this in-house medical community unprepared for a large-scale disaster. Just as local and federal emergency preparedness units had trained to cope with contingencies involving weapons of mass destruction, the two clinics routinely staged mass casualty “tabletop” exercises. The scenario changed for each drill; presciently, training carried out the previous May supposed casualties resulting from an accidental crash of a twin-engine airliner into the west side of the building. This premise was adopted at the suggestion of Colonel John Baxter, commander of the Air Fore Clinic, who, like everybody else in the building, wa reminded often that the Pentagon was on the Reagan National Airport´s flight path.
(Quelle: Goldberg et al: Pentagon 9/11, S. 107)
Der Übungshintergrund eines Unfalls wird von Oberschwester Brown in einem Interview am 11. September 2001 bestätigt:
Ironically, last April, Brown led a tabletop exercise of the clinic’s new mass casualty plan. Sitting at a table, members of the team walked through how they would respond if an airplane crashed into the Pentagon. But at the center of that imagined disaster was a plane that had malfunctioned after takeoff from nearby Reagan National Airport, not a hijacked jet commandeered as a missile.
“The training made a huge difference that day,” she says. “There is a use for all of that training.”“
Browns positive Einschätzung der Übung teilt John Felicio, Deputy Commander for Administration der DiLorenzo Clinic.
The saving grace to our efforts was the two MASCAL exercises we previously had conducted with the clinic leadership and staff. You know it was kind of eerie. The scenario we had for these MASCALS was very similar to what actually happened. Our scenario for both MASCALS was a plane flying into the Pentagon courtyard.
(Quelle: Marble/Milhiser: Soldiers to the Rescue, S. 18)
Col. John Baxter, der Kopf der Übung, bestätigt die positive Einschätzung ebenfalls:
I think partly because we had worked over the scenario so closely in May, things were actually fairly well organized for such a chaotic situation. The triage area was being set up. They had the vests available to identify your level of training, physician, nurse, EMT, and so on.
(Quelle: Marble/Milhiser: Soldiers to the Rescue, S. 58)
Dasselbe gilt für Paul K. Carlton, Jr., Chefchirung der USAF:
Just in May we held a mass casualty exercise at the Pentagon with the scenario being an airplane crashing into the building. We learned a lot from that exercise and applied those lessons to September 11. As I was rushing to the central courtyard from the DiLorenzo Clinic that morning, one younger “three-striper” with me was under the impression that this crash was just another exercise. That´s exactly the kind of preparedness you want. “I think this one´s for real, my friend,” I told him. “Just do what you practiced.
(Quelle: Murphy: September 11, S. 222)
- Die Übung wird in den einschlägigen Dokumentationen der betroffenen Einrichtungen durchweg genannt.
- Die allgemeine Einschätzung ist positiv, da die Übung eine schnelle und effiziente Reaktion auf den Anschlag am Pentagon ermöglicht habe.
- Ein terroristischer Hintergrund des Übungsszenarios wird in den einschlägigen Reporten und von Beteiligten entweder nicht genannt oder explizit zurückgewiesen.
- Das Flugzeug der Übung wird kleines Transportflugzeug beschrieben.
2. Die singuläre Gegenversion
Im Oktober 2001 wurde Paul K. Carlton, Jr. vom Magazin US Medicine zur MASCAL-Übung von Mai 2001 interviewt:
While nothing could prepare the country for the events of Sept. 11, the Air Force medical staff had practiced for this type of situtation. Dr. Carlton told U.S. MEDICINE that his team had run an exercise in May with a scenario in which a 757 crashes into the Pentagon. “We had worked out what would happen [and] what was needed,” he said.
Bereits die konkrete Nennung einer 757 lässt aufhorchen – in den einschlägigen Reportern und direkten Zitaten Beteiligter ist nur allgemeiner von „airplane“, „two-enginged airplane“ und „commuter airplane“ die Rede.
Kurz darauf wurde aus dieser Version im selben Magazin:
Though the Department of Defense had no capability in place to protect the Pentagon from an ersatz guided missile in the form of a hijacked 757 airliner, DoD medical personnel trained for exactly that scenario in May.
Wiederholt wird diese Version noch einmal im Januar 2002:
DoD’s reponse to the attacks was aided by the fact that department medical personnel had carried out a simulation exercise in May in which a hijacked 757 airliner crashed into the Pentagon. The Tri-Service DiLorenzo Health Care Clinic and the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic in Washington, D.C., fine-tuned their emergency preparedness after the exercise by making simple equipment changes that eventually helped when the real attacks took place.
Die MASCAL-Übung wurde demnach in der US Medicine zur Übung mit einer 757, die 757 zu einem entführten Flugzeug und das entführte Flugzeug zu einer „ersatz-guided missile“ erklärt – verblüffend viel Übereinstimmung mit den Anschlägen von 9/11 ist hergestellt. Keins dieser konkreten Elemente ist durch ein direktes Zitat von Beteiligten oder aus den einschlägigen offiziellen Reporten belegt, einige widersprechen den Angaben Beteiligter bzw. der offiziellen Reporte.
Die abschließende Einschätzung des Sachverhalts bzw. der singulären Extremversion der US Medicine bleibt selbstverständlich jedem selbst überlassen. Meiner Einschätzung nach handelt es sich um ein klassisches Beispiel für das „Stille Post“-Prinzip.
3. Gegner der „offiziellen Version“
Mathias Bröckers verkauft unwidersprochen die singuläre Version der US Medicine:
Im Oktober 2000 hatten hauseigene Einsatzkräfte des Pentagon ein Notfallszenario durchgespielt, bei dem es galt, sich auf ein in das Gebäude gestürztes Flugzeug einzustellen. Auch das medizinische Personal trainierte einige Monate später für diesen Absturz, bei dem nicht von einer Cessna oder einem Jumbo ausgegangen wurde, sondern von einer Boeing 757. Im Mai 2001 – fünf Monate nach Rumsfelds Machtübernahme – ging es im Rahmen dieser Notfallübung darum, “das Pentagon vor einer gelenkten Ersatzrakete (“ersatz guided missile”) in Form einer entführten Boeing 757″ zu schützen.
Diese Überlegung gegen terroristische Angriffe, sagen wir aus einem vorbeifahrenden Auto von außen, diese Überlegungen hatten schon 1992 Fuß gegriffen und natürlich wurden weitere Überlegungen gegenüber Angriffen auf das Pentagon geführt. Da gab es das MASCAL-Programm, mass casualties, ein Programm des medizinischen Dienstes im Pentagon, was passieren würde, wenn ein Großangriff zu vielen Verwundeten und Toten führen würde. Der medizinische Dienst des Pentagon hatte sich in einer Übung kurz zuvor darauf verständigt, was zu tun sei in einem medizinischen Notfall, falls zufälligerweise sich eine Boeing 757 in das Pentagon reinbohren würde. Es war eine 757, die sich am 11. September in das Pentagon reingebohrt hat.
Manfred Petritsch verkauft unter der Überschrift „Vorwissen“ unwidersprochen die singuläre Version der US Medicine:
- Mai 01 – Trainieren die Tri-Service DiLorenzo Health Care Clinic und die Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic, beide im Pentagon einquartiert, ein Notfallszenario für einen Absturz eines entführten 757 Passagierflugzeuges welches in den Pentagon stürzt.
Elias Davidsson verkauft unwidersprochen die singuläre Version der US Medicine:
The Pentagon had a medical exercise in May 2001 simulating a Boeing 757 crashing into the Pentagon.
?The Medics Go To War?
WASHINGTON-The tragedy which occurred here at the Pentagon at approximately 9:40 a.m. on Sept. 11 may well change both the organization and practice of medicine in all sectors-public and private-of the United States.
While nothing could prepare the country for the events of Sept. 11, the Air Force medical staff had practiced for this type of situtation. Dr. Carlton* told U.S. MEDICINE that his team had run an exercise in May with a scenario in which a 757 crashes into the Pentagon. “We had worked out what would happen [and] what was needed,” he said. From U.S. Medicine ? The Voice of Federal Medicine, May 2001
Dr. Carlton is Lt. Gen. Paul Carlton, the Air Force Surgeon General. Dr. Carlton is currently the Director of the Integrative Center for Homeland Security for the Texas A&M University System.
Update 09.03.2012: Seit Jahren wird die vereinzelte Extremversion der US Medicine von Gegnern der “offiziellen Version” als letzte Wahrheit zur Pentagon-MASCAL von 2001 verkauft, trotz starken Hinweisen, dass es sich um eine Überspitzung des Magazins handelt, die mit dem Originalwortlaut des interviewten Übungsarchitekten Lt. Gen. Dr. Paul K. Carlton Jr. nichts zu tun hat.
September/Oktober 2011, zum zehnten Jahrestag der Anschläge, reflektierte Paul K. Carlton Jr. in verschiedenen Medien noch einmal die Pentagon-Attacke und die vorherige MASCAL der zwei Kliniken. Neben den einschlägigen Beiträgen in Militärmagazinen erschien hierzu auch ein Artikel in der US Medicine. Carlton Jr. kommentiert dort ausführlich den Hintergrund der Übung (meine Hervorh.):
In addition, he had been involved in planning and approving mass-casualty exercises at the Pentagon earlier in 2001 that involved a plane scenario.
That came about in February 2001 when he and the Air Force’s Flight Medicine Clinic commander in the Pentagon at the time, now-retired Air Force Col. John Baxter, MD, were having a conversation in a stairwell in the Pentagon. Baxter suggested doing a mass-casualty exercise. For a moment, they had to stop the conversation because of noise from a plane taking off at nearby Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.
“So we had to stop talking for a moment as the airplane went by, and then he looked at me and said, ‘We have airplanes flying over here, hundreds a day’,” said Carlton. “Why don’t we do an airplane hits the Pentagon?”
Carlton liked the idea and suggested having the plane hit some birds, lose an engine and then do a VMC rollover and crash into the Pentagon.
“Reagan airport has a real bird problem. It was a very realistic scenario,” said Carlton.
A tabletop exercise of the scenario was done in May that included the Arlington County Emergency Medical Services, as well as the Army’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic and the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic, both located at the Pentagon. The scenario involved 187 dead from the crash.
During that exercise, officials identified the command and control difficulties and that they needed to do team training. Additionally, they realized they needed equipment for the teams and a way to identify who was a doctor, nurse and EMT during a mass-casualty event. This planning resulted in the distribution of blue, flame-retardant vests that were labeled “Nurse,” “Doctor” and “EMT” for the medical personnel at the Air Force Flight Medicine Clinic and the Army’s DiLorenzo Tricare Health Clinic.
Because they did not feel they had done well enough, Carlton said they set up another mass-casualty exercise for August 2001 that involved medical personnel practicing treating the wounded and working on evacuation. A “get-well” date to correct deficiencies in their plans then took place in an exercise on Sept 1, 2011.
Dieselbe Quelle, dasselbe Magazin – die Verabschiedung von der “ersatz guided missile”.
In einem ebenfalls zum zehnten Jahrestag der Anschläge veröffentlichten (aber bereits aus Oktober 2002 stammenden) Video der Reihe Voices of September 11th (min01:25-03:05), gibt Col. John Baxter, der zweite Kopf der Übung, weitere technische Details zum Profil der MASCAL:
Historically, we had one or two exercises the year. The year of the terrorist attack, 2001, we had one disaster scenario, and that occured in May, 2001. Both clinics participated and it was what we call a tabletop scenario, where all the players, or the personnel who´d be doing things medically, gathered in a room. A scenario was played, and it was actually a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation giving the scenario, and each of the participants would give their response, and say what their resource limitations where, and what actions they would take, and so on. The exercise in May of 2001 – the scenario was that of a jetliner strking the Pentagon at the Heliport. This has been very eerie for us, because that´s exactly what occured on September 11th. Looking back at the PowerPoint presentation, we have the scenario unfolding as first, hints that some disastaer had occured, then more details that it occured at the heliport, then details of patients down on the floor on the fifth corner, the halls being full of smoke, people crying for help, the building on fire …
Auch Colonel James Geiling wurde anlässlich des 10. Jahrestages noch einmal interviewt und spricht über die MASCAL der DiLorenzo-Klinik:
That’s a fascinating story. That training happened in May 2001.
I tried to do the training in three phases. I liken it to crawl, walk, run. The crawl phase was when I took command of the clinic in July of 2000. They had recently moved into a new facility. Serendipitously, the year before, I had been with the Office of Emergency Preparedness at Health and Human Services, on a War College fellowship. That whole year I had spent studying emergency preparedness, so it was on my radar screen.
I started by talking to people, looking at our equipment; it needed work. So we bought some equipment and began training, making sure skills were updated—a lot of individual training. Say somebody in the building gets hurt, we respond. My medics would grab their bags and drive to the scene in a special cart we had. My standard exercise was “Find me an airway with your eyes closed. You need to know your bag.” That was the crawl phase.
The walk phase was what we call a tabletop or command-post exercise. My staff developed it; I was purposely kept in the dark prior to the exercise. The scenario was a plane crashing into the Pentagon heliport. We set up an emergency operations center. There was a PowerPoint going in real time: here are the events; here’s the information you know; what would you do? There was simulated radio traffic and all this other stuff going on. I still have the slides; I show them in talks.
We did that in May. The next stage was going to be the run phase. We had planned to have a building-wide exercise with Arlington EMS, but we never got to that. We got to 9/11.
4. Flugzeuge als Waffen – unvorstellbar?
Das 9/11 Consensus Panel
Ein Schnappschuss aus dem Universum der Vorwissensanklagen. Das Griffin-inspirierte 9/11 Consensus Panel beantwortet in Punkt Pent-4 seiner besten Evidenz gegen die “offizielle Version” die Frage “Was There Foreknowledge by Officials that the Pentagon would be Attacked?” weitestgehend positiv.
This compelling array of evidence suggests that there was foreknowledge of the Pentagon attack by various officials.
Schon der Blick in die Fußnoten zeigt eine grundlegende Schwäche der Beweisführung. Ausschließlich Artikel der Massenmedien dienen als Belegmaterial, fast alle stammen aus dem Herbst 2001, viele aus den ersten Tagen nach 9/11. Die detaillierter werdende Berichterstattung an anderen Orten oder zu späteren Zeitpunkten wird komplett ausgeblendet, es sei denn, sie dient der eigenen Argumentation. So findet sich neben der selektiv präsentierten MASCAL aus dem Oktober 2000 (dazu hier) natürlich auch die ebenso selektiv präsentierte “guided missile in the form of a hijacked 757 airliner” als Beleg (s.o.). Die Behauptung, NORAD habe Übungen durchgeführt, in denen das Pentagon angegriffen wurde, wird mit zwei Quellen belegt, die der Behauptung explizit widersprechen (meine Herv.):
In a third scenario, the target was the Pentagon — but that drill was not run after Defense officials said it was unrealistic, NORAD and Defense officials say. (USA Today)
It is unclear whether the simulated scenario was that of a hijacked plane being “used as missile” — intentionally crashing into a building — or that of an out-of-control hijacked plane. Military officials said the exercise involved simulating a crash into a building that would be recognizable if identified, but was not the World Trade Center or the Pentagon. (CNN)
Das konsequent interessegeleitete Vorgehen schadet der Reputation des „wissenschaftlichen“ 9/11 Consensus Panels. Das Panel wiederholt unkritisch, was David Ray Griffin als verwertbar vorselektiert. Die Methode zieht sich nahtlos durch weitere Beispiele und Punkte.
Planes as weapons
Was das Beispiel des Pentagons illustriert, ist Teil einer Argumentationskette, um eine Auslegung der „suprise-Theorie“ zu widerlegen, die ein Zitat von Ari Fleischer in extrem elliptischer Form zusammenfasst (zit. nach dem 9/11 Consensus Panel):
Never did we imagine what would take place on September 11th, where people used those airplanes as missiles and weapons.
Fett markiert sind die beiden Schlüsselwörter, die über Sinn und Unsinn der Aussage entscheiden. Wer sind “wir”? Und was soll “vorstellen” umfassen? Der Generalismus solcher unterkomplexen Aussagen fordert ein Kontra geradezu heraus. Paraphrasiert lautet die Kontra-Argumentation der “Skeptiker”:
1. Laut „OVT“ habe prä-9/11 niemand sich vorstellen können, dass Flugzeuge als Waffen verwendet werden könnten.
2. Es gibt Beispiele von Personen, die sich prä-9/11 vorstellten, dass Flugzeuge als Waffen verwendet werden könnten.
3. Also ist die „OVT“ falsch.
Ausgeführt findet sich diese Argumentation bspw. in Griffins The 9/11 Commission Report, S. 263ff. Auf sonderbare Spitzen treiben den Zweifel Blogger wie Shoestring und Killtown mit Verweis auf TV-Produktionen, in denen Ähnlichkeiten zu 9/11 auftreten. Der Verweis zeigt die Strohmann-Logik des Arguments, denn natürlich hat nie jemand – nicht einmal Ari Fleischer – ernsthaft behauptet, auch kreative Drehbuchschreiber der Kino- und Fernsehwelt wären nicht auf die Idee gekommen, Flugzeuge als Waffen zum Filmmotiv zu machen. Die nackte Realität ist diesbezüglich älter als sämtliche angeführten Fiktivbeispiele. Es wird auch niemand behaupten, dass die USA im Kalten Krieg auf einen Atomschlag Russlands vorbereitet waren, weil ein derartiges Szenario in Filmen wie „The Day After“ auftaucht oder mal in einer von unzähligen Übungen Thema ist. (Eine tatsächliche Vorbereitung belegen dagegen bspw. Atomschutzbunkeranlagen.)
Die Frage ist entgegen knackig-elliptischer Zusammenfassungen, die als der „Failure of Imagination“ in die 9/11-Folklore eingingen, nicht, was sich irgendwer irgendwann für ein Szenario vor Augen führen konnte, sondern: Welches Szenario hat eine entscheidungsbefugte Stelle in Politik, Flugüberwachung, Militär und/oder Geheimdienst als derart ernsthafte Gefahr antizipiert, dass vor 9/11 Gegenmaßnahmen ergriffen wurden? Oder kurz: Auf welches Szenario war die Flugabwehr vorbereitet? Das ist der Knackpunkt der kompletten Debatte um Vorwissen und Surprise. Ausdenken kann man sich vieles, aber was davon wurde so ernst genommen, dass es zu Konsequenzen führte?
Was also ist hinsichtlich dieser Frage “offizielle Version” zu 9/11? Schon der Senatsreport von 2002 zeichnet ein deutlich differenzierteres Bild als ein politischer Akteur wie Ari Fleischer es in einem Satz jemals könnte (meine Herv.):
4. Finding: From at least 1994, and continuing into the summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community received information indicating that terrorists were contemplating, among other means of attack, the use of aircraft as weapons. This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat. (p. xi)
5.i. Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence Community as the mastermind of the attacks, to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity in the United States. The Intelligence Community, however, relegated Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM) to rendition target status following his 1996 indictment in connection with the Bojinka Plot and, as a [page xv] result, focused primarily on his location, rather than his activities and place in the al-Qa’ida hierarchy. (p. xiv)
Discussion: [While the credibility of the sources was sometimes questionable and the information often sketchy, the Inquiry confirmed that the Intelligence Community did receive intelligence reporting concerning the potential use of aircraft as weapons. For example, the Community received information in 1998 about a Bin Ladin operation that would involve flying an explosive- laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and, in summer 2001, about a plot to bomb a U.S. embassy from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. The FBI and CIA were also aware that convicted terrorist Abdul Hakim Murad and several others had discussed the possibility of crashing an airplane into CIA Headquarters as part of “the Bojinka Plot” in the Philippines, discussed later in this report. Some, but apparently not all, of these reports were disseminated within the Intelligence Community and to other agencies].
The Transportation Security Administration, for example, advised the Committees that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had not received three of these reports, that two others were received by the FAA but through State Department cables, and that one report was received by the FAA, but only after September 11, 2001. Many policymakers and U.S. Government officials apparently remained unaware of this kind of potential threat and the Intelligence Community did not produce any specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would in fact use airplanes as weapons. For example, former National Security Advisor Sandy Berger testified before these Committees that:
„I don’t recall being presented with any specific threat information about an attack of this nature [the use of aircraft as weapons] or any alert highlighting this threat or indicating it was any more likely than any other.“
That testimony is consistent with the views publicly expressed by the current National Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, shortly after the September 11 attacks.
Similarly, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified that he had not been made aware of this type of potential threat:
„I don’t recall any warning of the possibility of a mass casualty attack using civilian airliners or any information that would have led us to contemplate the possibility of our shooting down a civilian airliner.“
Even within the Intelligence Community, the possibility of using aircraft as weapons was apparently not widely known. At the FBI, for instance, the FBI Phoenix field office agent who wrote the so-called “Phoenix memo” testified that he was aware of the plot to crash a plane into CIA Headquarters, but not the other reports of terrorist groups considering the use of aircraft as weapons. The Chief of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division also confirmed, in an Joint Inquiry interview, that he was not aware of such reports. (p. 9f.)
The Joint Inquiry confirmed that, before September 11, the Intelligence Community produced at least twelve reports over a seven-year period suggesting that terrorists might use airplanes as weapons. As with the intelligence reports indicating Bin Ladin’s intentions to strike inside the United States, the credibility of sources was sometimes questionable and information often sketchy. The reports reviewed by the Joint Inquiry included:
• In December 1994, Algerian Armed Islamic Group terrorists hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. French authorities deceived the terrorists into thinking the plane did not have enough fuel to reach Paris and diverted it to Marseilles. A French anti-terrorist force stormed the plane and killed all four terrorists.
In January 1995, a Philippine National Police raid turned up material in a Manila apartment suggesting that Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Murad, and Khalid Shaykh Mohammad planned, among other things, to crash an airplane into CIA Headquarters. The police said that the same group was responsible for the bombing of a Philippine airliner on December 12, 1994. Information on the threat was passed to the FAA, which briefed U.S. and major foreign carriers.
• In January 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information concerning a planned suicide attack by persons associated with Shaykh al-Rahman and a key al-Qa’ida operative to fly to the United States from Afghanistan and attack the White House.
• In October 1996, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. A passenger would board the plane in the Far East, commandeer the aircraft, order it to fly over Tel Aviv, and crash the plane into the city.
• In 1997, an FBI Headquarters unit became concerned about the possibility that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) would be used in terrorist attacks. The FBI and CIA became aware of reports that a group had purchased a UAV and concluded that the group might use the plane for reconnaissance or attack. The possibility of an attack outside the United States was thought to be more likely, for example, by flying a UAV into a U.S. embassy or a U.S. delegation.
• In August 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that a group, since linked to al-Qa’ida, planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. As explained earlier, the FAA found the plot to be highly unlikely given the state of the foreign country’s aviation program. Moreover, the agencies concluded that a flight originating outside the United States would be detected before it reached its target. The FBI’s New York office took no action on the information.
In September 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that Bin Ladin’s next operation might involve flying an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. airport and detonating it. This information was provided to senior government officials in late 1998.
• In November 1998, the Intelligence Community obtained information that the Turkish Kaplancilar, an Islamic extremist group, had planned a suicide attack to coincide with celebrations marking the death of Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. The conspirators, who were arrested, planned to crash an airplane packed with explosives into Ataturk’s tomb during a ceremony. The Turkish press said the group had cooperated with Bin Ladin, and the FBI’s New York office included this incident in a Bin Ladin database.
• In February 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained information that Iraq had formed a suicide pilot unit that it planned to use against British and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. The CIA commented that this was highly unlikely and probably disinformation.
• In March 1999, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding plans by an al-Qa’ida member, who was a U.S. citizen, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian Presidential Palace and detonate explosives. The person, who received hang glider training in the United States, brought a hang glider to Afghanistan. However, various problems arose during the testing of the glider. He was subsequently arrested and is in custody abroad.
• In April 2000, the Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an alleged BinLadin plot to hijack a Boeing 747. The source, a “walk-in” to the FBI’s Newark office, claimed that he had learned hijacking techniques and received arms training in a Pakistani camp. He also claimed that he was to meet five or six persons in the United States. Some of these persons would be pilots who had been instructed to take over a plane, fly to Afghanistan, or, if they could not make it there, blow the plane up. Although the source passed a polygraph, the Bureau was unable to verify any aspect of his story or identify his contacts in the United States.
• In August 2001, the Intelligence Community obtained information about a plot to bomb the U.S. embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash the airplane into it. The Intelligence Community learned that two people who were reportedly acting on instructions from Bin Ladin met in October 2000 to discuss this plot.
The CIA disseminated several of these reports to the FBI and to agencies responsible for preventive actions. These included the FAA, which is responsible for issuing security directives, alerting domestic and international airports and airlines of threats the Intelligence Community has identified.*
In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, DCI Tenet mentioned additional evidence developed since September 11 concerning al-Qa’ida’s intention of to use airplanes as weapons:
[After 11 September, we learned from a foreign government service that in 1996, Bin Ladin's second-in-command, Muhammad Atif, drew up a study on the feasibility of hijacking US planes and destroying them in flight, possibly influenced by Yousef’s and Mukhtar's unrealized plans [the Bojinka Plot]. . . . Bin Ladin’s determination to strike America at home increased with the issuance of the February 1998 fatwa targeting all Americans, both military and civilian. The ideas about destroying commercial airliners that had been circulating in al-Qa’ida leadership circles for several years appear to have been revived after that fatwa, in the early planning stages of the 9/11 plot. We believe that outside events also shaped al-Qa’ida leaders’ thinking about an airliner attack.  the October 1999 crash of Egypt Air Flight 990, attributed in the media to a suicidal pilot, may have encouraged al-Qa’ida’s growing impression that air travel was a vulnerability for the United States].
Despite these reports, the Intelligence Community did not produce any specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would use airplanes as weapons, and U.S. policymakers apparently remained unaware of this kind of potential threat. (p. 209ff.)
Der 9/11 CR greift diese Stoßrichtung auf (meine Herv.):
NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Other threats were identified during the late 1990s, including terrorists’ use of aircraft as weapons. Exercises were conducted to counter this threat, but they were not based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the use of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction. (p. 17)
Although the FAA had authority to issue security directives mandating new security procedures, none of the few that were released during the summer of 2001 increased security at checkpoints or on board aircraft. The information circulars mostly urged air carriers to “exercise prudence” and be alert. Prior to 9/11, the FAA did present a CD-ROM to air carriers and airport authorities describing the increased threat to civil aviation. The presentation mentioned the possibility of suicide hijackings but said that “fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction.” The FAA conducted 27 special security briefings for specific air carriers between May 1, 2001, and September 11, 2001. Two of these briefings discussed the hijacking threat overseas. None discussed the possibility of suicide hijackings or the use of aircraft as weapons. No new security measures were instituted. (p. 264)
Threat reports also mentioned the possibility of using an aircraft filled with explosives. The most prominent of these mentioned a possible plot to fly an explosives-laden aircraft into a U.S. city. This report, circulated in September 1998, originated from a source who had walked into an American consulate in East Asia. In August of the same year, the intelligence community had received information that a group of Libyans hoped to crash a plane into the World Trade Center. In neither case could the information be corroborated. In addition, an Algerian group hijacked an airliner in 1994, most likely intending to blow it up over Paris, but possibly to crash it into the Eiffel Tower.14
In 1994, a private airplane had crashed onto the south lawn of the White House. In early 1995, Abdul Hakim Murad-Ramzi Yousef’s accomplice in the Manila airlines bombing plot-told Philippine authorities that he and Yousef had discussed flying a plane into CIA headquarters.
Clarke had been concerned about the danger posed by aircraft since at least the 1996 Atlanta Olympics. There he had tried to create an air defense plan using assets from the Treasury Department, after the Defense Department declined to contribute resources. The Secret Service continued to work on the problem of airborne threats to the Washington region. In 1998, Clarke chaired an exercise designed to highlight the inadequacy of the solution. This paper exercise involved a scenario in which a group of terrorists commandeered a Learjet on the ground in Atlanta, loaded it with explosives, and flew it toward a target in Washington, D.C. Clarke asked officials from the Pentagon, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and Secret Service what they could do about the situation. Officials from the Pentagon said they could scramble aircraft from Langley Air Force Base, but they would need to go to the President for rules of engagement, and there was no mechanism to do so. There was no clear resolution of the problem at the exercise.
In late 1999, a great deal of discussion took place in the media about the crash off the coast of Massachusetts of EgyptAir Flight 990, a Boeing 767. The most plausible explanation that emerged was that one of the pilots had gone berserk, seized the controls, and flown the aircraft into the sea. After the 1999-2000 millennium alerts, when the nation had relaxed, Clarke held a meeting of his Counterterrorism Security Group devoted largely to the possibility of a possible airplane hijacking by al Qaeda.
In his testimony, Clarke commented that he thought that warning about the possibility of a suicide hijacking would have been just one more speculative theory among many, hard to spot since the volume of warnings of “al Qaeda threats and other terrorist threats, was in the tens of thousands-probably hundreds of thousands.” Yet the possibility was imaginable, and imagined. In early August 1999, the FAA’s Civil Aviation Security intelligence office summarized the Bin Ladin hijacking threat. After a solid recitation of all the information available on this topic, the paper identified a few principal scenarios, one of which was a “suicide hijacking operation.” The FAA analysts judged such an operation unlikely, because “it does not offer an opportunity for dialogue to achieve the key goal of obtaining Rahman and other key captive extremists. . . .A suicide hijacking is assessed to be an option of last resort.”
Analysts could have shed some light on what kind of “opportunity for dialogue” al Qaeda desired. The CIA did not write any analytical assessments of possible hijacking scenarios.
One prescient pre-9/11 analysis of an aircraft plot was written by a Justice Department trial attorney. The attorney had taken an interest, apparently on his own initiative, in the legal issues that would be involved in shooting down a U.S. aircraft in such a situation.
The North American Aerospace Defense Command imagined the possible use of aircraft as weapons, too, and developed exercises to counter such a threat-from planes coming to the United States from overseas, perhaps carrying a weapon of mass destruction. None of this speculation was based on actual intelligence of such a threat. One idea, intended to test command and control plans and NORAD’s readiness, postulated a hijacked airliner coming from overseas and crashing into the Pentagon. The idea was put aside in the early planning of the exercise as too much of a distraction from the main focus (war in Korea), and as too unrealistic. As we pointed out in chapter 1, the military planners assumed that since such aircraft would be coming from overseas; they would have time to identify the target and scramble interceptors.
We can therefore establish that at least some government agencies were concerned about the hijacking danger and had speculated about various scenarios. The challenge was to flesh out and test those scenarios, then figure out a way to turn a scenario into constructive action.
Since the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941, the intelligence community has devoted generations of effort to understanding the problem of forestalling a surprise attack. Rigorous analytic methods were developed, focused in particular on the Soviet Union, and several leading practitioners within the intelligence community discussed them with us. These methods have been articulated in many ways, but almost all seem to have at least four elements in common: (1) think about how surprise attacks might be launched; (2) identify telltale indicators connected to the most dangerous possibilities; (3) where feasible, collect intelligence on these indicators; and (4) adopt defenses to deflect the most dangerous possibilities or at least trigger an earlier warning.
After the end of the Gulf War, concerns about lack of warning led to a major study conducted for DCI Robert Gates in 1992 that proposed several recommendations, among them strengthening the national intelligence officer for warning. We were told that these measures languished under Gates’s successors. Responsibility for warning related to a terrorist attack passed from the national intelligence officer for warning to the CTC. An Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Board had the responsibility to issue threat advisories.
With the important exception of analysis of al Qaeda efforts in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons, we did not find evidence that the methods to avoid surprise attack that had been so laboriously developed over the years were regularly applied.
Considering what was not done suggests possible ways to institutionalize imagination. To return to the four elements of analysis just mentioned:
- The CTC did not analyze how an aircraft, hijacked or explosives-laden, might be used as a weapon. It did not perform this kind of analysis from the enemy’s perspective (“red team” analysis), even though suicide terrorism had become a principal tactic of Middle Eastern terrorists. If it had done so, we believe such an analysis would soon have spotlighted a critical constraint for the terrorists-finding a suicide operative able to fly large jet aircraft. They had never done so before 9/11.
- The CTC did not develop a set of telltale indicators for this method of attack. For example, one such indicator might be the discovery of possible terrorists pursuing flight training to fly large jet aircraft, or seeking to buy advanced flight simulators.
- The CTC did not propose, and the intelligence community collection management process did not set, requirements to monitor such telltale indicators. Therefore the warning system was not looking for information such as the July 2001 FBI report of potential terrorist interest in various kinds of aircraft training in Arizona, or the August 2001 arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui because of his suspicious behavior in a Minnesota flight school. In late August, the Moussaoui arrest was briefed to the DCI and other top CIA officials under the heading “Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly.” Because the system was not tuned to comprehend the potential significance of this information, the news had no effect on warning.
- Neither the intelligence community nor aviation security experts analyzed systemic defenses within an aircraft or against terrorist-controlled aircraft, suicidal or otherwise. The many threat reports mentioning aircraft were passed to the FAA. While that agency continued to react to specific, credible threats, it did not try to perform the broader warning functions we describe here. No one in the government was taking on that role for domestic vulnerabilities.
Richard Clarke told us that he was concerned about the danger posed by aircraft in the context of protecting the Atlanta Olympics of 1996, the White House complex, and the 2001 G-8 summit in Genoa. But he attributed his awareness more to Tom Clancy novels than to warnings from the intelligence community. He did not, or could not, press the government to work on the systemic issues of how to strengthen the layered security defenses to protect aircraft against hijackings or put the adequacy of air defenses against suicide hijackers on the national policy agenda.
The methods for detecting and then warning of surprise attack that the U.S. government had so painstakingly developed in the decades after Pearl Harbor did not fail; instead, they were not really tried. They were not employed to analyze the enemy that, as the twentieth century closed, was most likely to launch a surprise attack directly against the United States. (p. 344ff.)
Analoge Ausführungen finden sich im Staff Report (meine Herv.):
The Commission staff found no evidence that the FAA knew, or possessed intelligence indicating, that Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates, or any other group was plotting to hijack commercial planes in the United States and use them as weapons. Administrator Garvey and Claudio Manno, Director of FAA’s Office of Civil Aviation Intelligence on 9/11, testified to that effect before the Commission.
Nevertheless, the FAA had indeed considered the possibility that terrorists would hijack a plane and use it as a weapon. In the spring of 2001, FAA intelligence distributed an unclassified CD-ROM presentation to air carriers and airports, including Logan, Newark, and Dulles. The presentation cited the possibility that terrorist might conduct suicide hijacking but stated: “fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction.”
In 1998 and 1999, the FAA intelligence unit produced reports about the hijacking threat posed by Bin Ladin and al Qaeda, including the possibility that the terrorist group might try to hijack a commercial jet and slam it into a U.S. landmark. It viewed this possibility as “unlikely” and a “last resort.” FAA perceived as far more likely that al Qaeda would hijack a flight overseas, where the terrorists had access to safe havens. They believe that from these safe havens, Bin Ladin could use passengers to bargain for the release of Islamic extremists imprisoned in the United States.
Many officials pointed out to us that despite numerous reports and assessments regarding the growing terrorist threat, the U.S. civil aviation system had been enjoying a period of relative peace. By 2001, it had been over a decade since a U.S. air carrier had been hijacked or bombed. (p. 53)
Das ist die „offizielle Version“ im Detail. Fett markiert sind die Passagen, die zeigen, dass Protagonisten wie die Mitglieder des 9/11 Consensus Panel bereits daran scheitern, die „offizielle Version“ in ihrer Vielschichtigkeit zu erfassen, geschweige denn zu widerlegen (vgl. auch Punkt ME-1 in der “best evidence”-Liste).
Natürlich sind auch diese Passagen im Kontext zu lesen, denn die Schlussfolgerung lautet nichtsdestotrotz:
This information did not stimulate any specific Intelligence Community assessment of, or collective U.S. Government reaction to, this form of threat. (Senatsreport, p. xi)
Neither the intelligence community nor aviation security experts analyzed systemic defenses within an aircraft or against terrorist-controlled aircraft, suicidal or otherwise. (9/11 CR, S. 347)
The Commission staff found no evidence that the FAA knew, or possessed intelligence indicating, that Bin Ladin, al Qaeda, al Qaeda affiliates, or any other group was plotting to hijack commercial planes in the United States and use them as weapons. (Staff Report, p. 53)
Auch die in diesem Zusammenhang vielzitierte Condoleezza Rice soll hinter geschlossenen Türen – in dem Fall in der Befragung durch die 9/11 Commission – erstaunliche Zugeständnisse gemacht haben (Ben-Veniste, Emperor´s New Clothes, S. 252f.):
Rice acknowledged that she had “misspoken” in regard to her famous statement in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that “no one could have imagined” planes being used as missiles. [...] Rice stated that she should have said “I” couldn´t have imagined such a tactic.
Widerspricht Rice hier der “offiziellen Version”?
Es kann nur von Vorteil sein, die “offizielle Version” zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, bevor man sie zu unterminieren sucht.
NORAD Exercises Hijack Summary
Häufig wird in der Debatte um Vorwissen und Surprise auf das Dokument „NORAD Exercises Hijack Summary“ aus dem Archiv der 9/11 Kommission Bezug genommen. Seit seiner Veröffentlichung im Jahr 2009 beflügelt es die Phantasie von „Skeptikern“ (meine Herv.):
How could it have happened that the organization responsible for defending U.S. airspace repeatedly practiced scenarios that so closely resembled the 9/11 attacks in the years leading up to those attacks? And considering that the existence of these plane-into-building training scenarios has largely gone unreported, might there have been other, similar scenarios practiced for by NORAD–or other U.S. military organizations–that we do not yet know of? A new investigation into 9/11 is clearly urgently required. And the role of these training scenarios is one of many aspects of the attacks that must be thoroughly examined. (Shoestring, Juli 2010)
Das Dokument ist zweifelsohne interessant und aussagekräftig, sollte in seiner Aussagekraft aber auch nicht überschätzt werden. Es handelt sich um ein vierseitiges Arbeitspapier, das von Miles Kara, Mitglied des für den Flugabwehrkomplex zuständigen Team 8 der 9/11 Kommission, angefertigt wurde und der Vorbereitung eines Besuchs der Übungsleitung in NORAD HQ diente (MFR des zugehörigen Interviews mit Paul Goddard/Ken Merchant hier, Audioaufnahme hier). NORAD hatte das Kommissionsteam im Vorhinein mit Material zu Luftabwehrübungen prä-9/11 versorgt und Miles Kara isolierte aus diesen Übungen sämtliche Entführungsreferenzen (E-Mails von Miles Kara an den Autor der Webseite am 15. und 17.10.2009).
Das Dokument ist also gezielt selektiv: Es identifiziert sämtliche Szenarien und Injects aus NORAD-Übungen von 1998 bis 9/11, in denen eine Flugzeugentführung eine Rolle spielte und ausschließlich diese. Das Dokument sagt damit z.B. nichts über die Zielsetzung der Übungen aus, deren Teil diese Szenarien und Injects waren.
Am Beispiel: Die Übung Vigilant Guardian in den Tagen unmittelbar vor 9/11, eine der diversen in dem Papier auftauchenden Übungen, umfasste nur auf Seiten des NORAD-Sektors NEADS u.a. folgende Szenarien:
- potentiell feindliche russische Flugzeuge (07.09),
- ein russisches Flugzeug, dass unerwartet landen möchte (07.09),
- eine Lockheed, die Assistenz beim Landen benötigt (08.09.),
- ein Drogenschmuggler (08.09.),
- ein Flugzeug, das Terroristen über NYC in die Luft zu sprengen drohen (09.09),
- ein Luftschiff ohne Strom (09.09.),
- ein nicht reagierendes Flugzeug (10.09.),
- eine Evakuierung von SEADS (10.09.),
- ein vom Kurs abweichendes russisches Flugzeug (10.09.),
- eine Bombendrohung bei WADS (10.09.) und
- friendly fire eines Militärjets (10.09.).
Von dieser bereits unvollständigen Liste taucht entsprechend der selektiven Zielsetzung nur ein einziges Szenario in dem Dokument von Kara auf: „Terrorists with explosives who plan to detonate them over NYC“ (NORAD Exercises Hijack Summary, S. 4). Aus diesem einzelnen Szenario z.B. abzuleiten, worauf Vigilant Guardian vorbereitete, ist unseriös.
Die einzelnen Sektoren haben laut der Übungs-Leitungsebene auf Seiten NORADs eigene Abteilungen, die in Eigenregie Szenarien und Injects entwickeln.
Merchant commented that the Sectors and the Region have their own exercise program designed to exercise their own Battle Staff. Merchant is responsible specifically for training at the NORAD level. The two can be cooperative, but the shops are clearly separated. (NORAD Paul Goddard/Ken Merchant MFR)
Das Dokument sagt ebenso nichts darüber aus, welches Szenario bzw. Inject auf welchen als real wahrgenommenen Gefahren beruhte.
Am Beispiel: Im Juni 2001 spielte NEADS im Rahmen von Amalgam Virgo ein Szenario durch, in welchem ein an AIDS erkrankter Haitianer einen Deal mit einem kolumbianischen Kartell abschloss, eine SEADS-Kommandostation zu zerstören (NORAD Hijack Exercise Summary, S. 3). Dennoch würde niemand auf die Idee kommen, zu behaupten, dass NORAD sich wirklich über die Gefahren Gedanken machte, die eine AIDS-Erkrankung für die Luftabwehr bedeuten könne oder dass dazu Warnungen aus Geheimdienstkreisen vorgelegen hätten (meine Herv.).
Goddard explained that the planners developed scenarios are not necessarily linked to real-possible threats, and that the scenarios thought of for NORAD exercises do not translate into real-world intelligence threat assessments. (NORAD Paul Goddard/Ken Merchant MFR)
Auch ein Szenario, in dem ein Flugzeug als Waffe verwendet wird, bedeutet entsprechend nicht automatisch, dass das Flugabwehrsystem auf dieses Szenario tatsächlich vorbereitet gewesen wäre oder aus Geheimdienstkreisen entsprechende Warnungen zugrunde gelegen hätten (meine Herv.).
Vigilant Guardian ’99 was conducted in October of 1998. From Goddard’s perspective, procedurally NORAD would not be able to make the decision to fire upon the aircraft. It was only designed to “push the players”, but it was not considered to be based on a threat. This applies to all “out of the box” training scenarios. Goddard and Merchant both agreed that it is a serious misrepresentation to think that the scenario was built on any type of intelligence. (NORAD Paul Goddard/Ken Merchant MFR)
Dieser Hinweis ist nötig, weil seit Jahren aus Injects dieser Szenarien je nach Bedarf weitreichende Schlussfolgerungen gezogen werden (meine Herv.):
Records since released show that NORAD practiced approximately 28 hijack exercise events in the 20 months leading up to 9/11. At least six of these were focused on hijackings located entirely within the Unites States, which puts to rest the excuse that NORAD was only looking for threats coming from outside of U.S. borders. (Kevin Ryan, Januar 2013, vgl. dazu hier)
Halten wir doch hier sicherheitshalber lediglich fest, dass man trotz der vielen Übungen von 1999 bis 2001 ausgerechnet das dann tatsächlich eintretende Szenario angeblich für wenig wahrscheinlich hielt. (Bröckers/Walther, 11.9. – 10 Jahre danach, S. 142f.)
Ergebnis: Das Dokument „NORAD Exercises Hijack Summary“ ist ein nützlicher Ansatzpunkt, um sich dem Übungsgeschehen prä-9/11 zu nähern. Viele der genannten Szenarien und Injects tauchen auch in den Erinnerungen von Beteiligten auf. Es sollte jedoch auf keinen Fall auch der Endpunkt der Analyse sein, weil allein einige Übung-Injects noch nichts über den Grad der Antizipation und Vorbereitung auf bestimmte Gefahren sagen. Hierzu sind deutlich weitreichendere Betrachtungen nötig, die neben O-Tönen auch Befehlsketten, Gefechtsstellungen, nachrichtendienstliche Einschätzungen und nicht zuletzt die konkreten Übungsunterlagen selbst in Rechnung stellen. Dann ist ein fundiertes Urteil möglich, dass die Einschätzung der “OVT” korrigieren oder auch bestätigen kann.
Ben-Veniste, Richard: The Emperor´s New Clothes. Exposing the Truth from Watergate to 9/11. New York: St. Martin´s Press 2009
Bröckers, Mathias/Walther, Christian: 11.9. – zehn Jahre danach: Der Einsturz eines Lügengebäudes. Frankfurt a. M.: Westend 2011
Goldberg, Alfred/Papadopoulos, Sarandis/Putney, Diane T./Berlage, Nancy K./Hancock Welch, Rebecca: Pentagon 9/11. Washington, DC: DoD 2007
Griffin, David Ray: The 9/11 Commission Report. Ommissions and Distortions. Northampton: Interlink 2005
Marble, Sanders/Milhiser, Ellen: Soldiers to the Rescue. The Medical Response to the Pentagon Attack. Washington, DC: Office of the Surgeon General 2004 (Online)
Murphy, Dean: September 11. An Oral History. New York: Doubleday 2002